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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE,
Defendant/Appellants.

)
)

) Docket No. 42326-2014
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District in the State ofldaho,
In and For the County of Kootenai
The Honorable Steve Yerby District Judge Presiding

Susan P. Weeks
JAMES VERNON and WEEKS
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile (208) 664-1684

W. Jeremy Carr, ISB # 6827
CLARK and FEENEY LLP
1229 Main Street
Lewiston ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
CAPSTAR Radio Operating Co.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellate
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPSTAR AN IMPLIED
EASEMENT
The district Court, and Capstar, rely on Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d

948, 951-52 (1976), Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647 (2009), and Davis v. Peacock,
133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362,366 (1999) to stand for the proposition that Capstar did not need
to show apparent continuous use. However, all three cases state that apparent continuous use is a
required element to create an implied easement.
In Shultz, the Court compared the four elements needed to create an implied easement for
right of way as set out in 1 Thompson, Real Property Treatise. Those elements were:
(1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious benefit to the dominant and
burden to the servient tenement existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the
premises by the common owner in their altered condition long enough before the
conveyance to show that the change was intended to be permanent; and (4) necessity
for the easement.

Shultz, at 774, 554 P.2d at 952. The Court went on to list the essential elements necessary to create
an implied easement under Idaho's case law. The Court said:
To establish an easement by implication in favor of the dominant estate, three
essential elements must be made to appear; (1) Unity of title and subsequent
separation by grant of dorainant estate; (2) Apparent continuous user; (3) The
easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant
estate.

Id. (citing Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,407 (1961). The Court went on to state
"that while the phraseology of the requirements set out in Davis v. Gowen, supra, is somewhat
different from that discussed in 1 Thomson s 396, the same principles are involved." Id. The Shultz

case clearly identifies apparent continuous use as an essential element necessary to create an implied
easement.
The Bird Court held that the three elements necessary to establish an implied easement by
prior use where:
( 1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the dominant
estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant
estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must
be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.

Bird, at 352,209 P.3d at 649 (2009) (citing Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,638, 132 P.3d 392,
395 (2006)).
In Bird, the plaintiff had established apparent continuous use prior to the separation but did
not establish that the use was intended to be permanent. Id. At 352,209 P.3d at 649. The Bird Court
did not do away with the need to show apparent continuous use, but only clarified that a plaintiff
needed to prove that the apparent continuous use was intended to be permanent.
The Davis v. Peacock Court also affirmed the need to establish apparent and continuous use
in order to establish an implied easement by prior use when it stated: "One of the requirements for
establishing an implied easement by prior use is that there has been open and continuous use of the
easement prior to the severance of the dominant and servient estates." Davis, at 641,991 P.2d at 366
(1999) overruled on other grounds by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho
616,226 P.3d 1263 (2010).
All of these cases stated apparent continuous use as one of the required elements necessary
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to create an implied easement by prior use. The district court did not make a finding that Capstar
had proven apparent continuous use, nor does the evidence support a finding that Funke had used
the long enough or sufficiently enough to show it was intended to be permanent. Mr. Funke testified
that he used the disputed road 20-30 times from 1968 to 1975. (Tr. P. 323, L. 2-5). This is an
average of three to four times a year. This use over undeveloped lands does not constitute apparent
and continuous use.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPSTAR A PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT
Capstar argues that Mr. Rook's use of the road, nor his agent's use of the road, was

permissive. This argument ignores the facts of the case. On July 14, 1966, the General Telephone
Company, ("GTC"), obtained an easement to access an acre ofland in Section 22. (R. P. 139). This
easement road is crossed what is now the Lawrence's prope1iy. (R. P. 140). Mr. Rook testified that
after he purchased the property he entered into an access agreement with GTE to use the access road.
(Tr. P. 513, L. 18-24; P. 514, L. 1-10). Mr. Rook's testimony was that he had GTE's permission
through their right to use the access road. Using a road across a servient landowner's property with
the permission of the dominant estate is not hostile or adverse. Neither Rook or Capstar did anything
to indicate that it was claiming an independent right to use the road other than the right it received
under GTE.
The facts of the case are clear that GTE had the legal right to cross the Lawrence property.
GTE gave Rook the right to use property under their right and gave them a key to access the road that
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crossed the Lawrence property. (Tr. P. 513, L. 18-24; P. 514, L. 1-10). Capstar must put Lawrence
on notice that they are claiming some independent right separate than Rook's agreement with
Capstar. This reasoning is similar to the purpose behind the public use exception. See, Hughes v.

Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006) where the Court held that when a claimant
is using the land along with members of the general public, it would simply be unfair to impute
knowledge to the landowner that the claimant is making an adverse claim.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the Lawrences respectfully request this Court to reverse the
District Court's Amended Final Judgment holding that respondents have an ingress, egress, and
utility easement arising from prior use and a prescriptive easement across their real property located
in Section 21, Township 51 North, Range 5 West, the Courts finding that the scope of said easements
is for reasonable use without limitation, the Courts issuance of an injunction enjoining the
Lawrences, agents, and heirs from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Capstar, its agents,
servants, contractors, employees, tenants, successors, or assigns from using, developing, maintaining,
improving, and/or servicing said easement. The Lawrences request this Court remand this case back
to the District Court with instruction to enter a judgement holding that the respondents do not have
an easement across their property.
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Respectfully submitted this #day ofJc..nwuy.J.ol (t;,
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

Id.,~

By:
W. Jeremy C(rr, a member of the firm
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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